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A
mAbstract
We analyze the effects of an ALMP for disadvantaged workers implemented in a
depressed area of Italy. Using propensity-score matching, we find that a) the
employment subsidy had a positive effect for participants on both the probability
of finding a job and income, b) the outcome of the policy was more positive for
women, and c) the program was more effective for older and less-educated female
workers. Using data on previous contacts between workers and firms and on informal
channels for job search activity, we ultimately explore the role of the program in
promoting the transition from informal to salaried employment.
JEL classification: C14; C83; J64; J16
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Informal economy1 Introduction
Women’s participation in the labor market is a classic topic in the labor economics
literature (see, for example, Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986), and gender issues are
receiving increasing emphasis in the policy agenda. A leading example of this
phenomenon is the so-called “Lisbon Strategy” of the European Union, which set a tar-
get of a 60% employment rates for women by 2010. Still, across European countries we
find highly heterogeneous conditions, and the EU has clearly indicated the need for
both structural welfare and labor market reforms to reach the target.
As Bergemann and Van den Berg (2008) suggest in their recent survey of the literature
on the effects of the active labor market programs (ALMPs) for women in Europe, an im-
pact evaluation analysis is of primary importance if we want to deepen our knowledge of
the forces driving gender differences in participation rates and income levels. That
notwithstanding, the literature on the effectiveness of ALMPs on employment and par-
ticipation outcomes for women is not vast, and as stressed by Card et al. (2011), “…few of
the programmes are targeted by gender: rather, in cases where gender-specific estimates
are available it is because the authors have estimated separate impacts for the same pro-
grammes on men and women.”1
In principle, ALMPs directly targeted at increasing the probability of unemployed
workers to return to work could have a relatively larger and more positive effect on2015 Deidda et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly credited.
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(2008) discuss, this may happen for various reasons. First, women’s labor supply could
have higher elasticity; and therefore, increasing their chances in the labor market can
result in a relatively stronger effect for this group of workers. Second, women may have
higher reservation wages and higher outside options to stay out of the labor market:
provided ALMPs increase the offer rate, women will obtain higher marginal benefits.
Third, in markets in which discrimination is important and women’s labor market at-
tachment is low, ALMPs can help women signal their productivity, thus increasing
their employment probabilities.
The need for gender-specific labor market policies is particularly pressing in Italy. Of
135 countries, the World Economic Forum (2011) ranks Italy in 90th place in Economic
Participation and Opportunity because women are much more likely to be unemployed
(or out of the labor force) and to earn less than men.2 The average employment rate
for Italian female workers in 2010 was 46%, well below the abovementioned European
Lisbon strategy target of 60%, and only two out of twenty Italian regions reached the
2010 target.3 The average male employment rate, 69%, was almost on target (70%) in
all Italian regions. As Del Boca (2005) suggests, Italy therefore is an interesting case
study to investigate both the dynamics of low labor force participation by women and
how ALMPs may influence participation. That notwithstanding, although particular
attention to gender differences in the evaluation literature has been devoted to stud-
ies of Nordic or Central European countries, very few studies focus on Southern
Mediterranean countries.
In this paper, we attempt to fill the gap by providing evidence of the effectiveness of
an ALMP called Interventi di Coesione Sociale (Interventions for Social Cohesion, or
ICS), which was recently implemented in the Southern Italian region of Sardinia.4 The
main aim of this ALMP was to improve employment probabilities and income for
disadvantaged workers using a set of interventions comprising, among other tactics,
counseling, employment subsidies and matching services. At first, this ALMP was con-
sidered as a pilot study of the Italian national program for labor market policies. How-
ever, its primary intervention consisted of a temporary employment subsidy paid to
private firms hiring eligible workers. Like most ALMPs, even the ICS program was not
specifically targeted by gender but was more broadly targeted to disadvantaged workers.
However, eligibility conditions were different depending on gender: women needed only
be unemployed, whereas men had to fulfill stricter conditions. As a result, 75% of our
sample (and of program participants) are women. This is hardly surprising because Sar-
dinia is among Italy’s least-developed regions, and in terms of the labor market gender
differential, LFS data indicate that Sardinia’s female labor market participation rates are
quite low (50% in 2010).
Our empirical analysis uses propensity score matching methods to investigate the
effect of the studied ALMP on the full sample of 859 individuals who entered the pro-
gram in 2006–2008. We match administrative data with a comprehensive survey that
provides us with both post-program information on employment status and income
outcomes and detailed pre-program individual and demographic characteristics.
Results on the sample of female workers indicate that the policy had a substantially
positive effect on both the probability of finding a job for the group of treated individ-
uals (about 43%) and their level of income (397 euros per month). We also check for
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ticular, we find larger effects for more disadvantaged categories: effects are higher for
low skilled than for high skilled workers (45% versus 40%) and for older workers with
respect to the younger cohort (43% versus 37%). Furthermore, we obtain a larger effect
for women than for our sample of disadvantaged men. However, when comparing these
results, we always need to take into account the different eligibility conditions for men
and women.
Together with the standard impact evaluation analysis, during the survey, we also
collected detailed information on pre-treatment search activity, unemployed individ-
uals’ previous experience and possible previous contacts between eligible workers and
the firms that subsequently hired them. Descriptive statistics show significant differ-
ences between treated and non-treated workers. First, and unexpectedly, treated indi-
viduals are less active in searching for a new job during the unemployment spell than
are non-treated individuals. Second, when searching for a job, treated individuals are
significantly less likely to use the public employment services channel and are more
likely to use informal search methods such as personal contacts, friends and relatives.
Third, using the answers received in our survey to the question, “Before being hired,
did you have the chance to collaborate with the firm that hired you?” we find that the
sample of treated individuals has a significantly higher probability of having had previ-
ous contact with the firm. Overall, these three pieces of evidence are consistent with
the hypothesis that, at least in part, the ICS program has been ultimately effective not
only in creating new employer-employee matches but also in promoting the transition
from informal employment to formal jobs. Indeed, compared to other OECD countries,
Italy has a significantly sized shadow economy.5
2 Description of the program
The ICS (Interventions for Social Cohesion) policy is the first comprehensive ALMP to
be implemented in the Italian region of Sardinia. It was first activated as a pilot pro-
gram to develop similar policy interventions on a national scale and was supported
jointly by the Italian Ministry of Labor and Social Policy and the Sardinian regional
government, which bore full responsibility for its actual implementation. Although the
program was formally launched in June 2004, it did not actually begin until 2006.
The ICS program was aimed at reducing unemployment and increasing re-
employment probabilities for different groups of disadvantaged workers. The financial
resources allocated to implement the program were 9,536,000 euros: 5,916,000 financed
by the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy and the remaining 3,620,000 by the regional
government. The program’s eligibility conditions varied depending on the applicant’s
gender. Women only needed to (a) be unemployed, (b) not receive any unemployment
subsidy and (c) be a resident in Sardinia. Men had to fulfill more stringent conditions:
(a) they were required to be long-term unemployed (unemployed for at least 24
months, certified by the local labor office), or they were required to (b) be older than
44 years of age, (c) not be receiving any unemployment benefits at the moment of ap-
plication for the program, and (d) reside in Sardinia.6
In principle, the ICS program was a composite labor market policy that involved sev-
eral types of interventions on both the labor demand and supply sides, thus directly tar-
geting firms and unemployed workers. The interventions specifically directed toward
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supply side of the program through a mixture of policies including employment subsid-
ies, counseling, tutoring and matching services.7 The latter service consisted of the pos-
sibility for unemployed workers to be directly matched to a vacancy in a firm that
exactly required her/his qualification profile.
However, the most relevant type of intervention envisaged by the ICS policy was a
typical hiring subsidy. Firms received an employment subsidy of 460 euros/month for a
maximum period of 12 months. This subsidy was conditional on eventually hiring
workers on a full-time contract for a duration of at least 18 months. At the end of the
additional 6-month period, firms also received an additional lump sum payment of
2,000 euros if they hired the worker on a permanent contract. In addition to these
monetary incentives, workers and firms were entitled to receive counseling support in
identifying their occupational needs, with tutoring related to the workings of the ICS
policy and the rules governing local and national hiring procedures.
As noted above, to reduce two-sided search costs, the ICS program also offered the
possibility for workers and firms to use a specifically organized matching service pro-
vided by a public employment agency, INSAR. At first, this was intended as the most
innovative intervention of the ICS program because effective public employment ser-
vices were absent in Sardinia. However, bureaucratic and organizational problems made
this part of the policy substantially unsuccessful: to match workers and firms, INSAR
developed a database that included the firms’ occupational needs and some demo-
graphic characteristics of participating workers. Indeed, not only did the database de-
velopment take much longer than expected, but also it ultimately lacked significant and
relevant information and was unsuitable for efficiently matching employers and em-
ployees. As a leading example, it is sufficient to say that the data collected contained no
information about workers’ educational attainment that might have helped match
workers to firms.8 Given all of these difficulties, such an (apparently) appealing feature
of the intervention was rarely used.
The unexpectedly large numbers of applicants (more than 10,000) caused long de-
lays in all of the bureaucratic procedures, and the program implementation had to be
postponed. Consequently, a significant number of firms originally interested in the
program decided to drop out, forcing the regional government to make a second call.
Therefore, we observe two waves of participants: the first call was opened from June
to December 2006, attracting the interest of 533 firms seeking 1,258 professional
profiles.9 The second call was opened in December 2007 and closed in March 2008,
with 423 firms applying for the program and seeking 952 job profiles. This second
wave of the program explicitly introduced the possibility of direct hiring (chiamata
nominativa) for firms willing to hire one or more particular workers in the partici-
pant pool. However, this possibility was ultimately allowed even during the first wave
and as we will see in the following sections, this option eventually crowded out the
public placement service offered by INSAR. Overall, 877 ICS beneficiaries enrolled
in the program. They agreed and began to participate in the program at different
times, and the last worker was enrolled at the end of June 2008. From the initial sam-
ple of 877 individuals, only 795 were eventually hired by firms, with the difference attrib-
utable both to dropouts (27) and to firms that decided not to hire the worker following
the probation period (55).
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3.1 Data
Our first source of data is the administrative database provided to us by the public em-
ployment agency (INSAR), which was in charge of implementing the program. As dis-
cussed in the previous section, this dataset only contains basic information on personal
characteristics (age, gender, place of residence and professional qualifications) for the
7,955 individuals who expressed interest and submitted the application form to become
eligible for the ICS program.10
Excluding the dropouts, approximately 10% of those who expressed their interest in
the ICS program (the 850 beneficiaries) were matched with an employer and eventually
treated.11 For them, the administrative source contains the following additional infor-
mation: the exact date on which the worker was hired, participation in training, the
characteristics of the contract offered to the worker (length, type of contract, hours/
week), occupational skill profile, and information on the employment subsidies and the
lump-sum payment of 2,000 euros granted to firms hiring workers on a permanent
contract.
Because this administrative dataset lacked important information relevant to the pol-
icy evaluation, we decided to complement the dataset with additional survey data.
Thus, a second set of data was collected through computer-assisted telephone inter-
views (CATI) that occurred between December 2009 and March 2010. First, we inter-
viewed a sample of 462 beneficiaries of the ICS program.12
To avoid potentially upward-biased estimates due to locking-in effects, we exclude
from this sample the 161 workers who were still under treatment or were very close to
completing it when interviewed.13 It is important to stress that for each beneficiary, the
ICS treatment was complete after a period of 18 months, i.e., the initial 12 months
during which the firms were receiving the monthly hiring subsidy plus the subsequent
6-month period that was necessary for the firms to eventually obtain the lump-sum
payment. Overall, our final sample of treated include those 301 workers who completed
the treatment (i.e., the employment period of at least 18 months after signing the con-
tract) at least 3 months before the interview.14
Second, we selected the group of non-treated individuals from the sample of those
who expressed interest in the program but did not receive the treatment. In this case,
we extracted 1,419 individuals to match the distribution of participants in terms of gen-
der, age and geographic area of residence.15 Thus, as we shall see below, the treated
and non-treated groups are quite similar in terms of the observed characteristics. After
excluding non-respondents and unavailable individuals, we ended up with a sample of
558 non-treated individuals.16 This led us to a final sample of 859 individuals, including
301 participants and 558 non-participants.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
The questionnaire used for the interviews enabled us to collect important additional in-
formation on individual pre-treatment characteristics that were missing in our adminis-
trative dataset and that were essential to perform our propensity score matching
analysis. We therefore turn to a more accurate description of these variables, with
particular attention to those used in the propensity score analysis. Table 1 provides de-
scriptive statistics for the most relevant variables concerning demographics, and Table 2
Table 1 Descriptive statistics: demographics (values in percentage)
Full sample Female subsample Male subsample
ICS
policy
Non-
participants
ICS
policy
Non-
participants
ICS
policy
Non-
participants
Main demographics
Female 73.8 75.5
Age (in years) 32.7 33.5 32.1 32.6 34.4 36.4
Family characteristics
Marital status single 60.5 66.0 59.5 63.9 63.3 72.3
Presence of children 31.6 31.5 34.2 34.0 24.1 24.1
Household members in need of
care (yes)
11.32*** 20.8*** 12.18* 18.06* 8.82*** 29.66***
Home ownership
Yes 75.4 73.7 73.0 73.2 82.3 75.2
Educational attainments
Lower secondary school or less 35.6 35.3 32.0 32.5 45.6 43.8
Upper secondary school 45.9 46.2 46.9 47.5 43.0 42.3
Tertiary education 18.6 18.5 21.2 20.0 11.4 13.9
Professional qualification
High skills 2.3 3.4 2.7 3.3 1.3 3.7
Technical skills 7.0 9.5 4.5* 8.08* 13.9 13.9
Administrative office skills 36.2 39.8 40.1 42.0 25.3 32.9
Retail and service 29.2 26.2 33.3 31.4 17.7 10.2
Artisans and farmers 7.3 4.8 1.8 2.1 22.78* 13.14*
Blue collars 2.3 1.6 0.9 0.7 6.3 4.4
Other unskilled (unspecified) 15.6 14.7 16.7 12.4 12.66* 21.9*
Notes: This table shows the main descriptive statistics on the socio economic characteristics of our sample of eligible
individuals. Data are differentiated both between treated (ICS Policy) and non treated (non participants) and by gender.
All variables refer to the pre-treatment period. Household members in need of care: refers to families where at least one
person needs long term care (elderly, disabled). Professional qualifications are self-reported. Asterisks denote that the
difference between treated/non treated is significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.
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we distinguish between treated and non-treated individuals and separately report de-
scriptive statistics by gender. For each variable, we also identify whether the difference
in the mean values of treated and non-treated individuals is significant. Below, we pri-
marily discuss the data of the female subsample because those individuals constitute
approximately 75% of our final sample (643 observations, including 222 participants
and 421 non-participants) and are the focus of our study. In terms of demographics,
Table 1 shows significant heterogeneity between men and women, whereas the differ-
ences between treated and non-treated are often trivial. Gender differences are easily
explained by the diverse eligibility criteria of the ICS program for the two groups. On
average, female participants are 32 years old, and as expected, they are slightly younger
than men because one condition of eligibility for the latter group is long-term un-
employment (i.e., being unemployed for at least 24 months) and/or being more than 44
years old. We have also asked for information concerning marital status and the pres-
ence of children because both variables purportedly influence participation in the labor
market, especially for women (see, among others, Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986).
Table 2 Descriptive statistics: previous employment and job search (values in
percentage)
Full sample Female subsample Male subsample
ICS
policy
Non-
participants
ICS
policy
Non-
participants
ICS
policy
Non-
participants
Subsidies and Training
Received unemployment subsidy 29.9 31.4 28.8 27.3 32.9 43.8
Received training 32.56*** 44.62*** 31.98*** 45.13*** 34.2 43.1
Job offers
Received offers 48.0 39.9 46.8 39.8 50.8 40.2
Accepted offers 44.76** 57.45** 45.2 54.0 43.75** 67.35**
Job Search
Active job search (yes) 72.76*** 84.41*** 70.27*** 82.9*** 79.75* 89.05*
Job search methods
Public employment services 22.37*** 48.62*** 21.79*** 49.0*** 23.81*** 47.54***
Private employment services 4.6 5.5 4.5 6.0 4.8 4.1
Internet 33.33** 23.99** 32.69* 24.93* 34.92** 21.31**
Personal contacts, friends
and relatives
32.88*** 15.07*** 32.69*** 13.75*** 33.33** 18.85**
Other 6.9 6.8 8.3 6.3 3.2 8.2
Previous job experiences
Short term 49.04*** 61.35*** 48.59*** 63.16*** 50.0 56.7
Permanent 38.94*** 28.38*** 38.03** 25.94** 40.9 34.6
Irregular 12.0 10.3 13.4 10.9 9.1 8.7
Previous network with the
current employer
Did you collaborate with this firm
before applying to the program? (yes)
61.21*** 7.17*** 63.69*** 5.98*** 52.83*** 10.83***
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics on job experiences and search activity for eligible workers during the
pre-treatment period. Data are differentiated both between treated (ICS Policy) and non treated (non participants) and
by gender. Job search methods: respondents could indicate two different options, ranked by importance. Previous network
with the current employer: percentages refer to the subsample of individuals that, at the time of the interview, declared
they had a formal job position (through the ICS program if beneficiaries, otherwise if non beneficiaries). Asterisks denote
that the difference between treated/non treated is significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.
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the treated sample reports having at least one child when they applied for the ICS treat-
ment. When considering the sample of non-treated, we observe a higher percentage of
single women (almost 64%), whereas the percentage of women with children is very
similar to that reported for the treated group. When we look at men, we find that the
percentage of men with children is substantially lower than that of women at approxi-
mately 24% for both treated and non-treated individuals, whereas the percentage of sin-
gles is higher (63% for treated and 72% for non-treated men).
Labor-force participation is also related to informal care for the elderly and disabled
people in the household (Leigh, 2010). This may be particularly important for our sam-
ple of Italian women for two related reasons: the lack of adequate formal care services
provided by the Italian welfare system and the traditional role of women as caregivers
(Norton, 2000). We find that the percentage of women living in a household in which
at least one person is in need of long-term care is always lower for the treated sample
(approximately 12% versus 18% for the non-treated sample).
Deidda et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:7 Page 8 of 25We now turn to an analysis of educational attainments and self-reported professional
skills. Again, we do not find significant differences between treated and non-treated in-
dividuals. As expected, women have higher educational attainments than the more dis-
advantaged sample of men. In general, Italian university-level attainment remains
below the OECD average: its percentage of the population (25 to 64-year-olds) that has
attained tertiary education in 2009 is 15%, significantly below the OECD average of
31% (OECD, 2012). Moreover, Italy has one of the highest regional dispersions of edu-
cation attainment.17 Thus, compared to the Italian average, the percentage of women
that completed tertiary education in our sample is high for both treated and untreated
individuals at approximately 20%. The largest proportion of our female sample left
school at the upper secondary school level (approximately 47% for both groups), but a
relatively high percentage, approximately 32%, ended their formal education before
upper secondary school. This last piece of evidence should not come as a surprise be-
cause Sardinia is characterized by very high percentage of upper secondary school
dropouts. In particular, secondary school dropout rates are higher among boys than
girls, and this evidence is confirmed in our sample of disadvantaged workers, for whom
we observe that almost half of our male (both treated and non-treated) sample ended
their formal educations at the lower secondary level. Moreover, men show significantly
lower percentages of tertiary education attainments than women (11% for treated and
14% for non-treated individuals, respectively).
Finally, Table 1 includes the distribution of individuals’ self-reported professional
qualifications, providing a proxy for skills. Professional qualifications are particularly
relevant for the purposes of our study because the public placement service provided
by the regional government to workers and firms was essentially based on workers’
self-reported qualifications and on firms’ desired job profiles. As expected, we find sig-
nificant differences between the sample of men and women, reflecting the lower educa-
tional attainments of the former group. In particular, a large portion of the women
sampled, approximately 73%, certifies professional skills suited for the service sector.
For example, the proportion of (treated) women reporting “administrative office” skills
is 40%, versus 25% for (treated) men. Conversely, the proportion of reported “artisans
and farmers” is high for men (about 23% for the sample of participants) and almost
zero for women (less than 2% for the sample of participants). Furthermore, we observe
that unskilled workers are slightly overrepresented in the sample of treated women
(approximately 17%) compared to the non-treated women (12%).
A second set of controls includes measures of previous experience and job searches
(Table 2). Unlike the set of individual characteristics discussed in Table 1, we do
observe significant differences between the treated and non-treated samples.18 One
exception is found when we ask whether applicants received unemployment benefits
pre-treatment: in this case, we observe similar percentages for both groups. Conversely,
when applicants were asked whether they received some training before the ICS policy
was implemented, differences arise: 13% of treated individuals replied “yes” to this
question, a rate significantly lower (32%) than that observed for the sample of non-
treated individuals (45%).
One of the most significant differences between treated and untreated individuals is
observed in terms of the individuals’ previous job search histories. We find that the
treated samples of both men and women have lower probabilities of being job seekers:
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the ICS program was approximately 70%, versus 83% for the non-treated. Interestingly,
more than half of those who actively searched for a job have received a job offer: the
percentage is higher for treated than for untreated individuals (47% versus 40% in the
women subsample). However, the percentage of those who accepted such an offer is ap-
proximately 45% for the female sample of treated individuals versus nearly 54% for the
sample of non-treated individuals.
When considering different search methods employed by job seekers, we also find
significant differences between treated and non-treated individuals.19 Table 2, shows
that when searching for a job, treated female individuals are significantly less likely to
use the (few) existing public employment services as a first option (22% versus 49% for
non-treated individuals) and are more likely to use personal contacts, friends and rela-
tives (33% versus 14% for non-treated individuals). Indeed, the latter method is one of
the most important search channels for the sample of treated women. Finally, the data
suggest that the Internet is among the most-used job search channels among the
treated, with more than 30% of respondents using such methods, whereas non-treated
individuals seem less likely to exploit the opportunities offered by new technologies. In
our survey, we also asked individuals to identify their two most important search chan-
nels. Some respondents reported exploiting only one search channel, and this percent-
age (not included in the tables) is significantly lower, 24%, for the untreated than for
the treated individuals, at 48%. Moreover, among the treated individuals, those who
exploited only one search channel declare to have almost exclusively (70%) used the in-
formal channel.
At first, these figures suggested that among the eligible individuals, the ICS policy
was effective in attracting less-motivated individuals. In principle, it is possible that the
program has been successful in helping the transition of this discouraged group of
workers into the labor force. However, this evidence is also consistent with a different
hypothesis. Given the large share of the informal sector in the Italian economy, it is
possible that treated individuals were not actively seeking a job because they were
already working under informal employment contracts. Consequently, the ICS program
may have increased the probability of transition from the informal to the formal sector.
To further investigate this possibility, in our survey, we also asked a series of
questions concerning both applicants’ overall job experiences and details about previ-
ous interactions with firms that ultimately hired them after their application to the pro-
gram. Remember that to become eligible for the program, individuals had to be
formally unemployed. The first set of questions refers to the most significant previous
job experience. When asked about the type of job they had before becoming un-
employed and applying to the program, respondents faced three possible answers: short
term, permanent and irregular contract. Interestingly, whereas almost half of the sam-
ple said they had a short-term contract, more than 10% of both groups reported they
previously worked without a regular contract. This percentage is higher for treated than
for non-treated individuals, at 13% and 11%, respectively (for the female sample).
We also asked additional questions to individuals who by the time of the interview had
eventually obtained a job through the program (treated) or were using alternative chan-
nels (for the untreated). In particular, we asked whether before applying to the ICS pro-
gram, they had the opportunity to collaborate with the firm that eventually hired them.
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Among the (female) treated, 64% answered positively to the first question; conversely,
when the same question was asked to the non-treated individuals who eventually found a
job without program support, this percentage drops to 6%. Moreover, when asked about
the type of collaboration they had with the firm before applying for the ICS policy, 93% of
the interviewed sample refused to answer, whereas among the very few that gave an an-
swer, 5% declared that they had been working under an informal employment contract.
Note that the high rejection rate observed for this question has an easy explanation be-
cause in theory: it was possible to infer from their answers the firms that had behaved
illegally.
Thus, the overall evidence reported on job search behavior and on previous contacts
between workers and firms suggests the possibility that the ICS policy was ultimately
used by both workers and firms to increase the transition rate from informal to formal
employment relationships. This hypothesis will be further investigated in the following
sections.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Identification strategy
Our analyses of the effects of the ICS ALMP use the standard framework of the poten-
tial outcome approach to causality or the Roy-Rubin model (Roy, 1951; Rubin, 1974),
and they focus on the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), that is, on the
effect the treatment shows for individuals who actually participate in the program.
Below, we briefly describe the identifying assumption of propensity-score matching
(PSM) methods that we apply in our study.20 PSM methods need to find a group of
treated individuals who are similar to the control group in all relevant pre-treatment
characteristics; the only difference being that one group was exposed to the evaluated
program, whereas the other group was not.
This methodology relies on two key assumptions. The first is the conditional inde-
pendence assumption (CIA), or unconfoundness, which implies that selection for the
treatment is exclusively based on observable characteristics, X, not affected by the
treatment. This assumption implies that our study observes (and controls for) all of the
variables that simultaneously influence both treatment assignment and potential
outcome. The second assumption is the common support condition that implies that
individuals with the same X values have equal positive probabilities of either receiving
or not receiving the treatment. This also implies that no matches can be formed to esti-
mate the average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) parameter when there is no
overlap between the treatment and non-treatment groups. Matching on every covariate
is difficult to implement when the set of covariates is large. To solve this dimensionality
problem, PSM estimates the propensity score, that is, the probability of participating in
a program conditional on X. It can be shown that under the CIA assumption, all bias
due to observables can be removed by conditioning on the propensity score. We omit
further details here while referring to the vast literature on the subject (e.g., Rosenbaum
and Rubin, 1983; Heckman et al., 1998; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Smith and Todd,
2005; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Below, we claim that it is plausible to assume that
our Xs, that is, our administrative and survey control variables, enable us to accept that
the CIA holds in our exercise and that the mean effect of treatment can thus be
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weighted by the propensity score of the participants.
We first analyze the variables that determine the selection into treatment, and then
we estimate the ATT through a matching algorithm. Before discussing the propensity
score specification, it is important to recall that two characteristics of our dataset
should help decrease the possible presence of bias in our estimates.21 First, we use the
same source of data (administrative and survey data) for both treated and non-treated
individuals. This should ensure that Xs in our probit model are similarly measured
across the two groups. Second, we have collected survey data from a sample of eligible
nonparticipants and participants.
Moreover, we also have a potential rich set of suitable additional covariates and are
therefore able to control for many characteristics that are likely to determine both
participation and labor market outcomes. That said, in choosing our X variables, we
will also consider that the inclusion of too many variables in the propensity score can
result in a higher standard error for the estimated propensity score and may reduce the
likelihood of finding common support.22 The choice of excluding some variables is pri-
marily justified by the presence of too many missing observations that would cause a
significant reduction in the sample size.23 Our final specification of the propensity score
that satisfies the balancing property includes the following covariates: gender, age, age
squared, and a series of dummies for the presence of children, marital status, home
ownership, presence of the elderly/disabled needing care, educational levels, job search
activity, unemployment subsidy and previous training. We also add a series of dummies
identifying the occupational profiles reported by individuals when they applied to become
eligible for the ICS program.24 All of the above variables represent the pre-treatment
socio-demographic characteristics that are supposed to influence the allocation of individ-
uals across the two groups.
We expect demographic characteristics such as participants’ age and gender to have
an effect on the probability of treatment because they also have an effect on individuals’
labor market outcomes, such as participation and employment status. In the same
spirit, the number of children, the presence of elderly/disabled in the household and
marital status are supposed to influence the probability of participating in the program,
especially for women. Likewise, dummies for previous occupational profile and educa-
tion levels are included because they should have an effect on the selection into treat-
ment. Finally, previous job search activity, past participation in training programs, and
having received an unemployment benefit should also influence the selection into
treatment.
Table 3 includes the results of the probit estimation on our main subsample of
women. Because of the presence of missing values on the control set, we are left with
579 observations (197 treated and 382 non-treated).25 Overall, results in the table are
as expected, with two possible exceptions. Indeed, the pre-treatment dummies on both
job search activity and participation in training programs show a negative and signifi-
cant coefficient, and we will return to these somewhat puzzling results in the following
sections. To give a better idea of the quality of our estimates, in Figure 1, we also report
the distribution of these estimated propensity scores. This distribution clearly shows
that the overlap assumption is satisfied because the propensity scores’ distribution of
the treated clearly overlaps the region of the propensity scores of the non-treated.
Table 3 Propensity score estimation: ICS policy versus non-participation
Female subsample
Variables Estimates
Coefficient St. error p-value
Age −0.017 0.017 0.306
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.375
Marital status single 0.154 0.071 0.030
Presence of children −0.085 0.064 0.192
Home ownership −0.006 0.048 0.907
Household members in need of care (yes) −0.090 0.054 0.114
Education dummies
Upper secondary school 0.059 0.054 0.277
Tertiary education 0.116 0.072 0.100
Professional qualification dummies
Technical skills −0.202 0.061 0.010
Administrative office skills −0.037 0.048 0.433
Retail and service −0.075 0.125 0.574
Other unskilled 0.056 0.066 0.390
Job search activity −0.155 0.052 0.002
Received unemployment subsidy 0.004 0.047 0.936
Received training −0.085 0.042 0.046
Sample size 579
Log-likelihood 33.02
Notes: Reporting marginal effects, see Section 3.2 for definition of variables. We focus on the subsample of women, but
results on the full sample are available upon request.
Figure 1 Propensity score distribution. Notes: These are propensity score distributions for treated and
non-treated individuals based on estimation in Table 3.
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come obtained by applying the kernel matching method to different samples together
with their corresponding quality measures. We claim that the kernel matching method
is the most appropriate in this context because the calculation of the outcome includes
the highest possible number of matched non-treated. In particular, when treated and
non-treated samples are not large, as in our case, this method enables us to obtain effi-
cient estimates of the policy’s effect.26
4.2 Main results
As mentioned above, the direct aim of the program was to integrate unemployed indi-
viduals into the labor market. In other words, we first check whether this policy has
caused an increase in the probability of acquiring and keeping a job for the pool of par-
ticipants using a standard binary outcome variable to measure workers’ employment
status following the termination of the program. Second, as is typical in the literature,
we also estimate the effect of the ICS program on participants’ incomes. For the latter
dependent variable, we do not have access to administrative data on income and exploit
the additional information at the self-reported level of net monthly disposable
income.27 Note that unlike the employment status analysis, many interviewed individ-
uals refused to answer specific questions about their income, which explains the ob-
served reduction in the sample size of both the treated and the control groups.
To set the scene, before focusing on the subsample of women, we investigate the
overall effect of the ICS policy and show the results obtained on the full (men and
women) sample. In row I of Table 4, we report the estimates of the ATT of our two
possible outcomes: employment and income. Considering the full sample of ICS partic-
ipants, our results suggest a 42% higher probability of employment for participants than
non-participants. Similarly, the analysis also suggests a 403 euro increase in average
monthly earnings for participants compared to non-participants with identical observ-
able characteristics. The matching quality for this sample is analyzed in Table 5, which
includes the mean standardized bias and the pseudo-R2 after matching. This table re-
veals that the resulting pseudo-R2 from the propensity score estimation is low, suggest-
ing a successful match.28 In general, Table 5 shows reassuring values for both income
and employment in most of the subsamples analyzed. Thus, unless necessary, we do
not further discuss this issue.
Moreover, because the eligibility criteria for the two gender groups are different,
below we appropriately divide the sample by gender. Even if the two subsamples results
are not entirely comparable, it is nevertheless interesting to investigate possible gender
differences in program outcomes. Given the a priori characteristics of our subsamples,
we may find either higher or lower effects. As discussed above, we may expect to find
higher effects for women for various reasons: a higher elasticity of women’s labor supply,
higher reservation wages, and previous evidence related to areas such as Sardinia, where
women have low participation in the labor market. However, recent findings in the
literature also suggest that ALMPs may be more effective for individuals from more
disadvantaged categories.29 In the case of the ICS program, to become eligible for
the program, men (unlike women) were required to belong to genuinely disadvan-
taged categories, and thus we cannot predict whether the effect is higher for women
or for (disadvantaged) men.
Table 4 Main results: kernel matching
Sample specification
OUTCOME VARIABLES
# Treated # Controls
Employment/income Employment/income Employment Income
(in euros per month)
I Full sample 265/223 500/420 0.418 403.6
(0.033) (40.9)
II Male subsample 68/58 118/97 0.406 345.5
(0.086) (126.6)
III Female subsample 197/165 382/323 0.427 397.6
(0.043) (40.3)
Female subsample
IV Low educational level 63/55 127/111 0.453 420.7
(0.088) (77.8)
V High educational level 134/110 244/203 0.396 368.9
(0.049) (48.6)
VI Younger cohort
(≤30 years)
89/75 157/133 0.369 345.3
(0.073) (63.5)
VII Older cohort
(>30 years)
108/90 225/190 0.430 406.9
(0.057) (56.7)
VIII First wave 75/59 382/323 0.336* 331.2
(0.061) (67.4)
IX Second wave 122/106 382 / 323 0.468* 421.7
(0.044) (45.5)
Notes: This Table shows the resulting ATT estimates. The 2nd and 3rd columns include the sample sizes for, respectively,
the treated and control groups for the two different outcomes (employment and income). Standard errors are in
parentheses and are based on bootstrapping with 200 replications. We apply an Epanechnikov Kernel with a
bandwidth of 0.06. Low educational level: this subsample refers to individuals with, at most, lower secondary school
attainment levels. High educational level refers to individuals with upper secondary school or above. First wave refers to
the first call of the ICS program launched in 2006. Second wave refers to the second call was launched in 2007 (see also
section 2). We performed the equality test comparing the estimated effects of the following groups: male vs female (II
vs III), low vs high educational levels (IV vs V), young vs old cohorts (VI vs VII), first vs second wave (VIII vs IX). *Indicates
that the difference of the two estimated effects is significant at the 10% level.
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statistically different from zero, the analysis suggests a larger effect of the program for
women: the results reported in rows II and III of Table 4 show a 43% higher probability
of employment for women and a 40% higher probability for men.30 Likewise, income
levels for women are higher than for men, with the difference between treated individ-
uals in the two groups being approximately 50 euros. Again, all of the estimated effects
are statistically significant at conventional levels. However, the matching quality for the
small sample of men, as reported in Table 5, is less satisfying and the results must be
interpreted with caution.
Accordingly, from now on, we specifically focus on the group of women that consti-
tutes approximately 75% of our full sample and further investigate whether we find dif-
ferent effects for different subgroups. Because all unemployed women were eligible for
the ICS program, our female sample is significantly heterogeneous in terms of, for ex-
ample, educational attainments and experience levels. Therefore, we may expect some
relevant differences depending on the type of (female) individuals who benefit from
Table 5 Quality of matching estimates
Sample specification Quality indicators
(measured after matching) OUTCOME VARIABLES
Employment Income
I Full sample Mean standardized bias 1.75 2.74
Pseudo-R2 0.001 0.004
II Male subsample Mean standardized bias 5.18 10.80
Pseudo-R2 0.016 0.030
III Female subsample Mean standardized bias 1.59 2.54
Pseudo-R2 0.002 0.004
Female subsample:
IV Low educational level Mean standardized bias 3.28 7.10
Pseudo-R2 0.004 0.02
V High educational level Mean standardized bias 2.74 3.56
Pseudo-R2 0.002 0.005
VI Younger cohort (≤30 years) Mean standardized bias 3.68 5.34
Pseudo-R2 0.005 0.019
VII Older cohort (>30 years) Mean standardized bias 3.41 4.36
Pseudo-R2 0.007 0.012
VIII First wave Mean standardized bias 2.01 3.89
Pseudo-R2 0.002 0.011
IX Second wave Mean standardized bias 2.48 3.63
Pseudo-R2 0.005 0.009
Notes: The matching quality indicators are measured after matching. Low educational level: this subsample refers to
individuals with, at most, lower secondary school attainment levels. High educational level refers to individuals with upper
secondary or above. First wave refers to the first call of the ICS program launched in 2006. Second wave refers to the
second call was launched in 2007 (see also section 2).
Deidda et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:7 Page 15 of 25participation, and we perform the full estimation procedure previously described for
different female subgroups of low/high education and younger/older individuals. As
found above for the male–female case, the estimated differences between these groups
are not statistically significant. Still these results offer some useful suggestions.
We first divide the sample into less (lower secondary school) and more (upper sec-
ondary or above) educated individuals. In the descriptive section of the paper, we
emphasize the relative importance of highly educated female workers in the sample,
and we first checked whether there were any differences in the effect of the policy
related to different levels of education. We find (see rows IV and V, Table 4) that less-
educated women benefit relatively more from the ICS program: the estimated effect on
the probability of being employed is equal to 45% versus approximately 40% for women
with upper secondary or tertiary educations. When considering income levels, we find
that women with lower levels of education earn an average of 420 euros per month, ap-
proximately 50 euros more than more-qualified workers. This pattern is not surprising
because the ICS policy was mainly targeted towards more-disadvantaged groups, and
similar results have been found in the literature (see Caliendo and Kunn, 2011).
Second, we consider different age groups. In this case (see rows VI and VII of
Table 4), we find that the effect of the policy on the probability of being employed is in-
creasing with age: participants under 30 years of age have an approximately 37% higher
employment probability than non-treated individuals, whereas this effect increased to
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sible explanations for this result. On the one hand, because age is a proxy for labor
market experience, this result may indicate that the ICS program was relatively more
effective for more experienced women who were out of the labor market for some rea-
son, possibly because their reservation wage or outside option was higher (this could
be the case for women with children). On the other hand, this group of workers could
be more disadvantaged in terms of labor market opportunities, possibly because their
human and search capital was largely depreciated and thus, the ICS policy reached its
target of increasing their opportunities in the labor market.
Finally, in rows VIII and IX of Table 4, we report estimates of the policy effect divid-
ing the sample between the two waves of the policy implementation that we described
in previous sections. As noted above, the first wave of the ICS program was launched
in 2006, but due to long delays in all bureaucratic procedures, a significant number of
firms dropped out of the program. A second call was then launched in 2007, and more
matching of workers with firms was performed. Thus, across beneficiaries, we have two
groups of people who entered (and ended) the program during two different periods.
Consequently, the results for the two waves may be interpreted as a short-term effect
(second wave) and a medium-term effect (first wave) of the ICS policy. The effect of
the policy in the first wave is significantly lower than that estimated for the second
wave: former participants in the program have a 33% higher probability to remain
employed compared to non-participants, whereas, as expected, the estimated short-
term effect (second wave) is higher and equal to 47%. Unlike the other group compari-
sons, we find that the difference in estimated effects between the first and the second
wave is statistically significant. This suggests that the effect of the policy tends to fade
out over time, and it raises doubts about the possibility of even smaller long-term
effects.
Overall, the magnitude of these effects is substantial but neither uncommon nor new
in this literature, especially when considering the effect of employment subsidies to pri-
vate firms on the probability of being employed. Indeed, similar results have been
found in different contexts and countries and suggest the effectiveness of such types of
interventions.31
Our full set of results is robust to the use of alternative matching estimators: we per-
formed the same analysis using nearest neighbors and radius matching estimators and
find no significant change in estimated effects. Results using radius matching are shown
in Table 6.32
4.3 Further results: informal search channels and informal employment
So far, the estimated effects of the policy across all samples have been interpreted in
the standard way, that is, as the probability that treated individuals can transform their
unemployment status into a salaried position. However, this is likely to tell us only part
of the story. Below, we explore another complementary (and not necessarily alternative)
explanation and examine whether this policy has also served as a tool to allow the con-
version of informal employer-employee agreements into formal employment relation-
ships in an area characterized by high unemployment levels.
Aggregate cross-country data show that with the exception of Greece, Italy has the
largest shadow economy (in percentage of official GDP) of all industrialized countries:
Table 6 Robustness analysis: radius matching
Sample specification OUTCOME VARIABLES
# Treated # Controls
Employment/income Employment/income Employment Income
(in euros per month)
I Full sample 264/223 500/420 0.420 411.2
(0.038) (40.9)
II Male subsample 68/58 118/97 0.406 374.3
(0.080) (108.7)
III Female subsample 196/165 382/323 0.421 388.8
(0.043) (42.1)
Female subsample
IV Low educational level 63/55 127/111 0.449 389.05
(0.076) (74.6)
V High educational level 134/110 244/203 0.381 364.3
(0.05) (52.3)
VI Younger cohort
(≤30 years)
89/75 157/133 0.375 341.7
(0.064) (66.03)
VII Older cohort
(>30 years)
108/90 225/190 0.429 406.2
(0.054) (53.9)
VIII First wave 75/59 382/323 0.351* 332.3
(0.059) (66.75)
IX Second wave 122/106 382/323 0.463* 424.6
(0.044) (43.3)
Notes: This table shows the resulting ATT estimates. The 2nd and 3rd columns include the sample sizes for, respectively,
the treated and control groups (and for the two different outcomes, employment and income). Standard errors are in
parentheses and are based on bootstrapping with 200 replications. We apply a Radius-matching method (caliper of 0.1).
Low educational level: this subsample refers to individuals with, at most, lower secondary school attainment levels. High
educational level refers to individuals with upper secondary or above. We performed the equality test comparing the
estimated effects of the following groups: male vs female (II vs III), low vs high educational levels (IV vs V), young vs old
cohorts (VI vs VII), first vs second wave (VIII vs IX). First wave refers to the first call of the ICS program launched in 2006.
Second wave refers to the second call was launched in 2007 (see also section 2). *Indicates that the difference of the two
estimated effects is significant at the 10% level.
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OECD countries was below 14%. Furthermore, this phenomenon is highly heteroge-
neous across regions, with Southern areas, such as Sardinia, having shares that are ap-
proximately twice those observed in the North.33 The same pattern is observed for
unemployment rates, which for the past three decades have been three to four times
higher in Southern Italy than in Northern Italy. The observed high incidence of infor-
mal work in Italy (and Sardinia) is explained by both the absence of a universal system
with adequate levels of unemployment benefits and the presence of high hiring costs.34
Below, we therefore investigate whether this has also been the case for the ICS policy.
Suggestions that our estimated policy effects are likely to be not only new matches
but also transitions from informal to formal employment are discussed in the previous
sections. In particular, in the descriptive section, we see that with respect to the non-
treated sample, the percentage of beneficiaries that declared an active job search before
the treatment is significantly lower. Results from the propensity score reported in
Table 3 confirm this, showing a negative and significant coefficient of job search activity
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ing, and this evidence is largely consistent with the idea that treated individuals were
less active in job-searching (and training) activities because they already had a job.
Third, as noted in Section 3.2, we find clear-cut evidence that participants in the ICS
program are more likely to search for a job using informal methods such as personal
contacts, friends and relatives, and also to use this search channel exclusively. Again,
this is consistent with the presence of previous informal employment because the infor-
mal economy is often based on verbal and illegal contracts and necessarily must be
more likely to exploit social relationships based on trust than to use formal
agreements.
Following previous recent studies, we further investigate this issue and examine the
characteristics of those workers who rely more on informal contacts when searching
for a new job. We estimate a probit model in which the dependent variable is a dummy
that takes the value of one if the individual has answered yes to using informal chan-
nels, that is, “personal contacts, friends and relatives,” to find a job. We include a
standard set of covariates: age, educational attainments, previous unemployment bene-
fits, previous training, home ownership, marital status, presence of children and profes-
sional qualifications. Results on both the full sample (models 1 and 2) and the female
subsample (models 3 and 4), reported in Table 7, are consistent with the evidence
found in previous similar empirical analysis.35 Unlike other studies, we also introduce
in our set of controls a dummy on previous contact with the firm (models 2 and 4).
More specifically, we use the answers to the question, “Before being hired, did you have
the chance to collaborate with the firm that hired you?” The idea for this question was
to capture the presence of previous connections and, possibly, previous black-market
agreements between workers and firms. This may also explain why almost 20% of the
sample did not answer this question: they were worried about signaling the presence of
a previous illegal agreement.36 As expected, our proxy for informal employment shows
a positive and significant coefficient. Overall, our results are also consistent with the
evidence found in the literature on social capital.37 They suggest that informal contacts
are used more frequently by less-educated and older individuals who tend to use this
channel exclusively.
From our descriptions in Section 3.2, we also know that the sample of treated indi-
viduals has a significantly higher probability of a previous relationship with the firm.
We therefore use the possibility offered by our data and run a separate analysis to in-
vestigate the policy effects for the subsample of individuals who declared having known
and collaborated with the firm before being hired from those who did not. To save
space, we do not show the results here; however, they indicate that the program’s effect
is associated with negative employment probabilities, at −17%. Conversely, for those
who reported no previous contact with the firm that subsequently hired them, the ef-
fect is both positive and very large (60%).38
A second possibility offered by our data is the ability to exploit the data separately
for the sample of individuals who used the program’s employment services versus the
sample of workers hired directly by the firm (chiamata nominativa). In fact, it was im-
possible for firms to select a specific worker through the employment services offered
by the ICS program, whereas this was possible in the latter case. This result implies the
potential presence of transitions from informal to formal employment only in the
Table 7 Probit estimates: informal methods as main job search channel
Female subsample
Variables
Full sample Female subsample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 0.004** 0.005** 0.005** 0.006**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Marital status single −0.097* −0.062 −0.106* −0.090
(0.052) (0.055) (0.058) (0.062)
Presence of children −0.065 −0.040 −0.081* −0.068
(0.043) (0.049) (0.047) (0.052)
Home ownership −0.044 −0.038 −0.066 −0.066
(0.036) (0.039) (0.041) (0.044)
Education dummies
Upper secondary school −0.084** −0.110*** −0.030 −0.044
(0.036) (0.039) (0.042) (0.045)
Tertiary education −0.144*** −0.160*** −0.112*** −0.120***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.043) (0.043)
Professional qualification dummies
Technical skills −0.031 0.006 0.021 0.047
(0.061) (0.075) (0.085) (0.097)
Administrative office skills −0.063* −0.053 −0.104*** −0.095**
(0.038) (0.042) (0.040) (0.042)
Retail and service 0.075 0.050 0.056 0.057
(0.075) (0.080) (0.135) (0.133)
Other unskilled 0.019 −0.002 0.031 0.011
(0.044) (0.047) (0.052) (0.054)
Previous contacts with the firm (yes) 0.171*** 0.155***
(0.047) (0.054)
Received unemployment subsidy 0.038 0.043 0.052 0.044
(0.034) (0.037) (0.040) (0.043)
Received training −0.061** −0.030 −0.044 −0.023
(0.031) (0.034) (0.035) (0.039)
Sample size 690 578 505 431
Pseudo R-squared 0.107 0.129 0.112 0.132
Log-likelihood −314.29 −259.51 −221.85 −183.24
Notes: The coefficients represent the marginal effects evaluated at the mean values of the explanatory variables in the
sample. The standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable takes the value of one if the individual
has used “personal contacts, friends and relatives” to find a job and zero when other methods are used. ***, **, *indicate
that the coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
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nominativa, worker selection through the employment services is rare; all of the
matches occurred during the first wave of the ICS program, and thus, results could also
be driven by medium- versus short-term effects. Nevertheless, our analysis suggests
that faced with the choice between a public placement service offered by the regional
government or choosing from a list of eligible unemployed workers selected from the
previous (informal) agreements, the vast majority of firms choose the second option,39
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job creation. In fact, it is likely that (at least some of the) firms benefited from the em-
ployment subsidy to (re)hire workers who already worked for them under either tem-
porary or informal contracts.40
Overall, our results are consistent with the idea that the hiring subsidies offered by
the ICS program have decreased hiring costs for firms and that the latter took advan-
tage of this possibility, at least in part, to convert previous informal (black market)
agreements into formal employment contracts. It is also possible that policy makers
saw this as a potential (and positive) side effect of the program. In this case, our ana-
lysis implies that the ICS policy has been inefficiently designed. Indeed, the expensive
public employment and training services offered by the program, although useful for
the unemployed, were unnecessary for undeclared workers. This also raises concerns
about the long-term effects of the policy because firms may have primarily exploited
temporarily reduced labor costs for individuals who were already working—they did
not create new jobs. However, due to small sample size problems, all of these results
need to be taken with a grain of salt and are more suggestive than they are conclusive.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we study the labor market effects of a policy intervention (ICS) that was
recently implemented in the Italian region of Sardinia. The intervention was adminis-
tered by the regional government and had the objective of increasing the probability of
employment for specific disadvantaged groups of workers. It consisted of a range of dif-
ferent actions, such as counseling, placement services and employment subsidies for
private firms, the latter being the main intervention that was finally implemented.
The ICS program can be seen as a pilot (at least for some parts) of a comprehensive
labor market reform currently under discussion in the Italian Parliament. First, because
its characteristics, the implementation of this program may offer some useful lessons.
More specifically, the failure of the program’s matching services provides a warning
about the inefficiencies of the Italian public employment services and their possible
consequences in terms of policy effectiveness. Likewise, the program’s hiring subsidy is
similar to the social security break for new employees introduced in the 2015 Italian
draft budgetary plan: there are high expectations for this national subsidy boosting
labor demand in 2015.41 Overall, although the differences between the regional hiring
subsidy analyzed here and the national subsidy make direct comparison difficult, the re-
sults reported in this study can nevertheless offer some guidance to infer the effects of
these future interventions.42
We estimate the effects of this policy using standard propensity score methods and
focus on the sample of women, which constitutes approximately 75% of our total sam-
ple. First, our estimates indicate that the ICS policy increased the probability of female
participants acquiring a job by about 43% and that effects are generally stronger for the
women than for the men in our sample. This result is in line with other findings in the
literature and suggests that women may significantly benefit from participating in this
type of program. However, comparability between the two samples is reduced by the
different eligibility criteria required of men versus women. Unlike women, to be eligible
to participate in the program, men had to belong to genuinely disadvantaged categories.
Thus, because the literature suggests that ALMPs may be more effective for these
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gender differences.
Due to these differences in eligibility criteria, we focus on the female subsample. Even
considering this more homogeneous sample, we find the more disadvantaged categories
showing larger policy effects. More specifically, the estimated effects are stronger for
the two categories of low-educated and older female workers. Moreover, because the
program was implemented in two distinct (albeit close) periods, we have also per-
formed a separate analysis for the two waves. In this case, we find that the estimated ef-
fect of the policy is higher for those enrolled in the second wave, which seems to
suggest that the policy’s effect tends to decrease over time. Thus, it is also likely that
with new data for an observation window longer than the period of support we exam-
ined here, the long-term estimated effects would be significantly lower.
Moreover, using further information about the implementation of the policy, pre-
treatment search activity and informal contacts between workers and firms that is usu-
ally difficult to obtain, we have attempted to reveal both the role played by informal
search channels in depressed labor markets and their possible interactions with an im-
plemented ALMP. Our data offer many clues that indicate the possibility that the ICS
program has been used to convert previously informal employment agreements into
formal employment relationships, and they cast some doubt upon how the ICS policy
has been designed.
In sum, our primary contribution is threefold. First, we provide some direct empirical
evidence on the effects of ALMPs on women, which is particularly relevant to the de-
bate on participation and labor-market interventions such as hiring subsidies and pub-
lic employment services. Second, whereas the evaluation literature that pays particular
attention to gender differences has been devoted to studies of Nordic or Central
European countries, this is one of the very few studies to focus on the Southern
Mediterranean area. Third, our data provide some suggestive evidence for the role
played by informal agreements and family/professional ties in a depressed labor market.
Together with the possibility of a follow-up interview for workers’ long-term outcomes,
future research avenues should further investigate the role of the informal economy in
determining labor-market outcomes.
Endnotes
1See Card et al. (2011), p. F460. The presence of effects heterogeneity between men
and women is found by, among others, Kluve et al. (1999), Gerfin and Lechner (2002),
and Bergemann and Van den Berg (2008). More recently, Caliendo and Kunn (2015)
focus on self-employment schemes (start-up subsidies) and find a general gender gap in
terms of effects of these innovative ALMPs, even though results may vary depending
on the choice of the outcome variable.
2On gender differences in the Italian labor market, see, among others, Sulis (2012).
3Across 307 EU NUTS2 areas, the European region with the lowest participation rate
differential between men and women is Stockholm (4.5%), whereas Emilia Romagna,
the Italian region with lowest differential (17%), is in 218th place. Most Southern areas
are included among those regions with the highest gender differences; Puglia (306 over
307) is the worst, with a 32% difference between male and female participation rates.
4More details can be found in INSAR (2008a) and INSAR (2008b).
Deidda et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:7 Page 22 of 255See Schneider (2012). See also Bratti et al. (2005) for the effects of the lack of a for-
mal contract on women’s labor market participation in Italy, and Boeri and Garibaldi
(2001) for a matching model of the shadow economy with unemployment calibrated on
Italian regional and sectoral data.
6Among those eligible, the ICS program also included special disadvantaged categor-
ies such as former drug addicts and alcoholics. However, because such individuals
represent a small percentage of the ICS participants and can be considered as outliers,
we have excluded them from the analysis.
7A similar policy has been described by Rodriguez-Planas and Jacob (2010), who ex-
amined Romania’s Employment and Relocation services.
8Firms had to provide information about their name, sector of activity, headquarters, oc-
cupational profile and number of potential workers required. Unemployed applicants had
to provide information about gender, age, dwelling, preference for geographic area of work
and two professional qualifications. We will return on this point in the next sections.
9The first report provided by INSAR (2008a, b) calculates that during the first wave
of the program, firms received the hiring subsidy for only 242 out of the requested
1,258 job profiles (the numbers are 344 out of 952 during the second wave). The main
reasons for the high firm-dropout rate observed in the first wave listed in the report
are the following: 1) the long delays of the bureaucratic procedures; 2) the skill mis-
match between labor demand and supply; and 3) a reassessment made by firms about
their financial ability to hire additional workers.
10More precisely, 10,408 applications to participate in the program were received, but
2,453 did not satisfy the admission criteria.
11The administrative dataset shows that the 27 dropouts quit the program immedi-
ately after receiving the proposal. From discussions with the staff that implemented the
program, we see that in most cases, the dropouts found a job before receiving the ICS
offer but had not notified the regional administration. We exclude them from the
analysis.
12During the interview process, approximately 10% of the sample (48 individuals)
refused to grant an interview, and 25 arranged a later contact with the interviewer but
they failed to appear. Moreover, 188 did not respond, and 127 were associated with an
incorrect telephone number. Excluding both these individuals and the 27 dropouts, our
interviewed sample consists of 462 treated individuals with a response rate of 54%.
13The locking-in effect arises when a program evaluation is conducted at a point at
which individuals still receive the treatment. To obtain unbiased results, the observa-
tion window should be longer than the period of support.
14We exclude all beneficiaries that enrolled in the program starting in May 2008. We
also performed the analysis to include the 161 workers whose employment subsidy period
was not yet (or had only recently) finished. Not surprisingly, we find larger effects, and we
interpret these results as plagued by upward bias due to locking-in effects.
15A very similar approach can be found in Rodriguez-Planas and Jacob (2010).
16Considering the initial sample of 1,419 individuals, during the interview process,
338 (24% of the total sample) refused to grant an interview, 104 did not appear at the
telephone appointment, 246 did not respond, and an incorrect telephone number was
associated with 173 contacts. For our control group, we therefore have 558 observa-
tions and a response rate of 39.3%.
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18In most cases, the mean values reported in Table 2 are based on a smaller sample
size because a significant number of individuals refused to answer some of these
questions.
19As we will explain in the next section, we were not able to include all of these vari-
ables in the propensity score because the number of observations drops substantially.
20For more details, see Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008).
21On this point, see Heckman et al. (1998) and Heckman et al. (1999).
22See Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) for the advantages and disadvantages of over-
parametrization. See also Khandker et al. (2010) and Byrson et al. (2002) for recom-
mendations against over-parametrized models.
23This is the case for variables related to previous job offers (169 individuals refused
to answer) and previous job experiences. We have 281 missing observations (of which
235 relate to the female subsample). We also exclude the job search methods variables:
including them does not change the results, but only worsened the quality of the
match.
24Area dummies are not included because, as noted in the previous sections, non-
treated individuals match the distribution of participants in terms of the geographic
area of residence. Nevertheless, including them does not change the main results.
25The initial female subsample was comprised of 643 observations (222 treated and
421 non-treated). Results for the alternative samples are available upon request.
26More specifically, we apply an Epanechnikov Kernel with a bandwidth of 0.06.
Bootstrapped standard errors have been calculated based on 200 replications. To im-
prove the quality of the matches, estimates are performed imposing the common sup-
port condition in the estimation of the propensity score. See Becker and Ichino (2002)
and Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008).
27More precisely, we do not have access to administrative data on income and we
collected data using answers to the following question: “At present, what is your net
monthly income (include unemployment benefit)?” In doing so, we obtained a measure
of disposable income that includes both wage and non-wage income. On this point, see
Lechner and Melly (2007).
28A mean standardized bias below 5% denotes the success of the matching approach.
For more on this issue, see Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008).
29See for example, Caliendo and Kunn (2011) and Rodriguez-Planas (2010).
30We have performed the equality tests for non-matched samples with the assump-
tion of unknown and unequal variances and computing the p-values following the pro-
cedure described in Huber et al. (2014). On this, see also Caliendo and Kunn (2015).
31For example, these results are in line with those obtained by Rodriguez-Planas
(2010), who finds that in Romania (Table nine of her paper), participants in a similar
labor market program had a probability that was from 32 to 57% higher of being
employed than non-participants. Sianesi (2004) finds similar results for Sweden.
Gerfin and Lechner (2002) find a probability equal to approximately 10% for
Switzerland.
32Results using nearest neighbor matching are available upon request.
33See Schneider (2012) for cross-country data and Eurispes (2012) for details on Italian
regions.
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and strict employment regulations. See OECD, Employment Outlook.
35See Ponzo and Scoppa (2010) and Cappellari and Tastiramos (2011).
36We are aware that this is an imperfect proxy of this phenomenon: as noted in
Section 3.2, we could not further verify whether workers and firms already had a previ-
ous informal employment relationship because a direct question to this issue had a re-
jection rate of more than 90%.
37“…[T]he effect of social capital is more pronounced among less educated people,
who need to rely more on trust because of their limited understanding of contracting
mechanisms.” Guiso et al. (2004), p. 527.
38Unfortunately, missing values significantly reduce the sample size: even including
both women and men, in the control group, we are left with only 31 observations.
Thus, these results need to be viewed with caution. Furthermore, results do not signifi-
cantly change if we exclude men from the analysis, and we also find almost identical
but non-significant results when using income as outcome variable.
39See Fougère et al. (2009) and Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw (2006) for papers
studying the interactions between formal and informal search channels. See Loriga and
Naticchioni (2011) for a study dealing with the role of Italy’s public employment
services.
40We thank an anonymous referee for useful comments on this part of the analysis.
See Section 2 for more details on the two types of matching processes.
41We thank a referee for suggesting this point. The aim of this reform is to improve
the governance and effectiveness of active labor market policies in Italy, strengthening
social security through a wide unemployment benefits program and improving training
and job-finding services. The potential gains of planned interventions in the area of
ALMPs are particularly promising, but the improved functioning of public services is a
long-awaited precondition.
42The new 2015 national employment subsidy is more generous than that examined
in this study. Indeed, the former can last for (a maximum of) three years, whereas the
ICS subsidy examined in this paper lasts only one year.
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